Marcus Perlman (The Gorilla Foundation), Francine G. Patterson (The Gorilla Foundation), and Ronald H. Cohn (The Gorilla Foundation)
Saturday, May 19th
Buchanan B215
Geoffrey S. Nathan (Wayne)
Friday, May 18th
Buchanan A201
This talk will examine some recent research in musical cognition and explore how what we understand about our perception and storage of music is paralleled by some aspects of how language is processed. Using the concept of image schema transformation (Lakoff 1987) as a central pivot I will explore how the same mechanism underlies both the use of lexical items, innovative constructions (recently dubbed snowclones, as exemplified by ‘Small is the new black’), the storage and perception of iconic musical works (Levitin 2006) and the development of Western classical and popular music (lectures by Brandt, 2011).
Work by Levitin (2006), shows that we store exact representations of iconic musical performances with remarkable accuracy. Yet we are also able to reproduce them quickly and naturally in a different key, or beginning at a different octave. This ability corresponds to what Lakoff (1987) calls image schema transformations. Image schemas were proposed as a way of understanding and ‘representing’ knowledge of the world, but were understood to be deeply embodied, in the sense that they were experienced through our physical interaction with the meaning of the body (Johnson 1987; Johnson 2007). Image schema transformations involve motivated deviations from the prototypical image schema, such as Lakoff’s famous discussion of ‘over’. In his early work Lakoff (1987: 440–61)) examined how numerous different senses of the word could be derived from the central one (the picture is over the fireplace), explaining how senses such as ’think it over’, ‘the game is over’ and so on, through his notion of image schema transformation, the idea that the prototypical image schema could be adjusted in principled ways (both physically–‘put the wallpaper over the hole in the wall’, and metaphorically–‘My opponent is a pushover’). Image schema transformations are a central mechanism for words to acquire extended meanings that were related to the central meaning, yet derived from it in principled, but not totally predictable ways.
Recent work by Anthony Brandt at Rice University, in what is seemingly an unrelated area, the fundamental structure of western music, suggests that image schema transformations are an essential part of how western classical music is constructed and perceived.
Brandt suggests that (at least) western classical music develops thematically by construct a theme, which is then ‘developed’ through three methods–bending, breaking and blending. ‘Bending’ consists of modifying the theme (inverting, changing key, etc.). Breaking means playing only a part of a theme, perhaps with repetitions. Finally, blending includes playing more than one theme at once, or two or more ‘broken’ parts of the theme, or even simultaneously playing two or more ‘bent’ versions (which is, in fact, what ‘harmony’ consists of).
This paper will explore the similarities between the development of motivated, but novel senses of words and sentences, and the systematic development of theme and variation as instantiations of the same cognitive mechanism. The primary difference between linguistic and non-linguistic transformations is that linguistic uses are normally used one at a time, whereas musical instances are frequently developed either simultaneously or with successive (non-)repetitions. I will illustrate this with linguistic examples of novel expressions known as ‘snowclones’ . Snowclones (O’Connor; Pullum) are productive fragments of language that build upon set phrases, and are often used playfully (‘small is the new black’). I will also discuss two simple musical examples, one from classical music and the other from Broadway.
Johnson, M. 1987. The Body in the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
—— 2007. The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G. 1987. Women, Fire and Dangerous Things. What Categories Reveal About the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Levitin, D. J. 2006. This is Your Brain on Music. New York: Dutton.
O’Connor, Snowclones E. http://snowclones.org/about/
Pullum, G. Snowclones http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/000350.html
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Carol Lynn Moder (Oklahoma State University)
Friday, May 18th
Buchanan B215
In cognitive linguistics, early studies of metaphor gave scant attention to the form of metaphorical expressions and their relation to their discourse context (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). In Blending Theory, Fauconnier & Turner (2002) do grant a role to form by positing that grammatical expressions cue the listener in constructing a blend, but they do not specifically consider situational discourse relations. Oakley & Coulson (2008) extend the blending theory approach to encompass Langacker’s concept of grounding (1999), emphasizing that situational knowledge of the speech event and its purposes and participants are critical to an understanding of the ongoing mapping cued by the discourse. The ways in which metaphorical expressions ground discourse relations between speakers and hearers has been further elaborated by a number of recent discourse-based studies (Cameron 2003; Semino 2008, 2010, Moder 2004, 2008, 2010). One key aspect of such situational grounding which needs further elaboration is the relation of the speaker’s construal of the listener’s domain familiarity to the form and mapping of the metaphorical expression.
This paper focuses on the mappings cued by two specific space builders often used in metaphorical expressions in natural discourse, like and as (Think of the sweet receptor protein as a lock and key, Think of the skin as a desert, What goes on in the playroom is like kittens wrestling). The domain for the investigation is spoken news media discourse on science. The public science domain is of particular interest because it involves participants with widely discrepant background knowledge of the target domain. The metaphorical expressions in this domain may encode mappings that are conventional to the scientist, but novel to the public audience or they may encode deliberate novel metaphors. The way these different metaphorical expressions cue the relevant mental spaces and mappings is critical to the hearer’s ability to understand the discourse topic.
The metaphorical expressions were drawn from a researcher-collected corpus of American National Public Radio news magazine programs (1,000,000 words). We selected segments in which a scientist discussed a recent finding, examining all instances of metaphorical expressions using like or as. Expressions were categorized through larger corpus searches as representing technical metaphors common to the field of study or more novel metaphors introduced by the scientist for discourse specific purposes. These two categories of expressions were then analyzed with respect to the space builders used to cue them and the position of the target domain inferences in discourse.
For the more novel metaphors, the metaphorical expressions were generally cued with multiple space builders, which explicitly cued target domain information given earlier in the discourse and mapped it to source domain inferences elaborated following the metaphorical expression For the more conventional technical metaphorical expressions, there was variation in the use of space builders and the explicitness of inference elaboration. The inferences cued by these expressions often were less elaborated, leaving the hearer to run the blend using limited domain knowledge. The implications of these findings for modelling blending in ongoing discourse will be discussed.
Tyler Marghetis, Ben Bergen, and Rafael Núñez (UC, San Diego)
Saturday, May 19th
Buchanan B213
Mathematics is notoriously certain and stable, an archetype of abstract thought. But this is an accomplishment, not a given, and actual mathematical practice is flexible, contested, even agonistic (Lakatos, 1976). Indeed, mathematical practice may be a site of pervasive conceptual metaphor and integration (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000; Alexander, 2011). Like many everyday concepts, mathematical notions often invite more than one construal. Lakoff and Núñez (2000), for instance, suggest that we may conceptualize arithmetic metaphorically as Motion Along a Path or, alternatively, as Object Collection. However,! at present there are no experimental studies of the real-time embodied conceptualization of arithmetic. In our study, we asked two questions: Are these two hypothesized construals deployed during real-time reasoning about arithmetic? How stable are these construals, and can individuals be influenced to adopt one or the other? To answer these questions, we looked at participants’ reasoning in speech and gesture— their composite conceptualization.
We used a priming paradigm that involved task-irrelevant mental imagery followed by a semi-structured interview about arithmetic. Participants began by completing one of two non-mathematical mental imagery tasks meant to prime relevant image schemas—either Container or Source-Path-Goal. They then answered questions about arithmetic (e.g., “Why is the sum of an odd number and an even number always odd?”), and their responses were video-recorded. We reasoned that, if the conceptualization of arithmetic recycles embodied resources like image schemas, then task-irrelevant mental imagery should prime the associated conceptualization of arithmetic, as revealed in gesture.
Co-speech gesture was segmented into target gestures that co-occurred with talk of arithmetic, and two analysts coded these for handshape (grasping, pointing), handedness (one-, two-handed), and stroke direction. Qualitative and quantitative analyses identified two recurring gesture profiles. “Collecting” gestures were bimanual and used grasping handshapes, and suggested a conceptualization of arithmetic as Object Collection (Fig.1,top). “Path” gestures were one-handed and used canonical pointing morphology, and suggested a conceptualization as Motion Along a Path (Fig. 1, bottom). Participants switched fluidly between construals—sometimes even within a single gesture unit—integrating multiple construals of arithmetic during real-time reasoning (cf. Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Additionally, mental imagery had the predicted effect on subsequent conceptualization as revealed by gesture: Participants who completed the mental imagery task designed to prime a Container schema were significantly more likely to exhibit an Object Collection construal; likewise for Source-Path-Goal imagery and! a Motion Along a Path construal (Fig. 2). The salience of embodied mental resources, therefore, shaped participants’ composite conceptualization.
Participants exhibited the kind of flexible and creative conceptual integration that is familiar from studies of discourse or joke comprehension but unexpected in mathematics, a paragon of stability and certainty. In this study, co-speech gesture supplied empirical evidence that the real-time conceptualization of arithmetic is metaphorical and embodied. Moreover, the deployment of these multiple, complementary construals was flexible and sensitive to context. We conclude by suggesting that these shared construals of arithmetic may be a source of imagination and insight, but also a source of inferential stability.
See the attached PDF for figures and references:
Jean-Rémi, Paul Lapaire (Université Michel de Montaigne-Bordeaux 3, France)
Saturday, May 19th
Buchanan B215
Building on Arnheim’s claim that « there are perceptual equivalents of all theoretical notions» (1969), McNeill’s theory of « abstract pointing » (1992, 2005), Talmy’s concept of « ception » (2000), I would like to show that the conceptual organization and hidden cognitive mechanisms of grammar can be made visible and meaningful by using special iconic, deicitic and metaphoric gestures called KineGrams (Lapaire 2006). This special kind of “gestural action” (Kendon 2004) and its associated symbolism require the creation, observation and manipulation of imaginary objects of conception, as well as a highly plastic and symbolic use of space in order to represent conceptual regions and domains of experience. In this visuokinetic rendering of grammatical processes and meanings, speakers and cognizers are cast in the role of viewers and movers who adopt a number of epistemic and socio-pragmatic stances. Postural and gestural analogs of grammatical notions and processes are thus created that are visually explicit.
The visuo-kinetic display is to a large extent image schematic (Johnson 1987, Lakoff & Johnson 1999), and consistent with the «schematicity » of grammatical meaning (Langacker 2000). KineGrams make full use of the « abstract properties of gesture » (McNeill 1992). More importantly, they enact some of the moves characteristically made by the IBC – or Idealized Body of Cognition (Lapaire 2008). This is the abstract body image and metaphoric bodily activity that is unconsciously invoked by ordinary speakers to construe and report socio-physical experience, like « weighing options », « grasping essentials » (HANDS), « going ahead », « following », « moving forward », « standing in the way » (LEGS / FEET), « observing », « looking back / ahead » (EYES), etc. KineGrams may serve as a basis for visuo-kinetic explorations of language structure and language use in workshop settings. In this presentation, filmed scenes from « Grammar and movement » sessions held with linguistics students (aged 20-30) and bilingual schoolchildren (aged 8-10) will be shown.
The presentation will end with remarks on how KineGrams may also be used to develop an awareness of the contribution of spontaneous gestural activity to grammatical meanings and processes in oral discourse. Examples will be given of the verbo-gestural construction of aspect, comparison, concession, epistemic modality, changes of state and processes, time reference, etc. in spontaneous speech (Calbris 1990, Fricke 2010). As will be shown, abstract grammatical meanings may be performed and even drawn by children, after careful observation and workshop practice.
See the attached PDF for figured and references:
Download PDF
Seiko Yamaguchi Fujii (Tokyo University), Paula Radetzky (National Tsing-Hua University, Taipei) and Eve Sweetser (UC, Berkeley)
Sunday, May 20th
Buchanan A201
Recent crosslinguistic work on separation verbs has used video scenarios which systematically vary physical parameters (e.g., shape or texture of the theme, blade-like instrument or blunt instrument or none, presence/absence of an agent) and ask native speakers to name the scenarios (e.g., Majid et al. 2007) — in English, CUT, BREAK and TEAR are high on the list of labels chosen. However, polysemy patterns of separation verbs in English, French and Japanese pose problems for this approach. First of all, parameters do not in fact vary orthogonally, but cluster in ways that reflect frame-based correlations (Fillmore 1982, 1985; Bouveret and Sweetser 2009). For example, in actual frames of experience, clean separation correlates well with a bladelike instrument (English CUT), and so does division for apportionment (particularly of food), as opposed to intentional destruction. Force exertion without a blade correlates well with less tidy separation lines (English BREAK) and also with loss of functionality of the whole.
It is particularly suggestive that many languages have verbs referring to the overlap between the correlated frames of (1) (caused) loss of integrality, and (2) loss of function in a complex functional entity. Japanese KOWASU refers almost exclusively to (caused) loss of function (of a computer, an ecological system, or even a person’s digestion or health), but it can certainly involve physical damage and destruction as the cause of function loss. If loss of function is not saliently involved, other Japanese verbs (depending on shape/class of theme) must be used. English BREAK and French CASSER refer to general loss of integrality of a rigid object (a cup, a bone) and also to loss of function of a complex object without necessary loss of physical integrity (a non-functioning computer or bicycle). A frame-based semantics allows us to posit polysemy patterns which are structured by frame correlations, rather than by changes in specific parameters. Correlations would give rise to added parameters — e.g., Japanese ORU ‘fold/break’ (as in (1)- (2)) refers primarily to exertion of force causing the theme to bend (and maybe break as a result).
(1a) purasutikku-ban o (kanetu site) otta (1b) napukin o otta
plastic-sheet OBJ heat.and ORU.PAST napkin OBJ ORU.PAST
‘[I] folded the plastic sheet (by heating it).’ ‘[I] folded the napkin.’
(2a) purasutikku-ban o (pakin-to) otta (2b) koeda o otta
plastic-sheet OBJ with.a.snap ORU.PAST twig OBJ ORU.PAST
‘[I] broke the plastic sheet (with a snap).’ ‘[I] broke the twig.’
Clearly, the “bending” frame is sometimes correlated with loss of integrality, and hence the verb covers BREAK scenarios as well as FOLD ones.
Constructions, as well as verbs, evoke frames (Goldberg 1995, 2006). The English intransitive focuses on the theme change of state (It broke) without specifying lack of human participation in the scene; however, the frame of “spontaneous” breakage or tearing normally involves an (unintentional but observable) actor or force. Video clips showing breakage or tearing, with no visible cause, may formally vary parameters (agent/lack of agent) but do not correspond to actually experienced frames, or (therefore) to ordinary uses of the intransitive construction.
In sum, lexical verbs do not refer to single frames, such as clean separation, but to polysemy patterns structured by multiple-frame correlation clusters (such as clean separation, blade use, and food preparation). Languages may refer to different frame clusters; Japanese focuses on the bending/breaking correlation, while English does not. The frame-cluster linking loss of integrality with loss of function is common crosslinguistically, but even that is differently manifested in English and Japanese.
References.
Bouveret, Myriam and Eve Sweetser. 2009. Multi-frame semantics, metaphoric extensions and grammar. BLS 35
Fillmore, Charles J. 1982. Frame Semantics. In Linguistic Society of Korea, ed., Linguistics in the Morning Calm, 111-138. Seoul: Hanshin.
_____. 1985. Frames and the semantics of understanding. Quaderni di semantica 6:2, 222-53.
Goldberg, Adele E. 1995. Constructions: A construction grammar approach to argument structure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____. 2006. Constructions at work: The nature of generalization in language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Majid, Azifa, Melissa Bowerman, Miriam van Staden, and James S. Boster. 2007. The semantic categories of cutting and breaking events: Crosslinguistic perspective. Cognitive Linguistics 18:2 (special issue on separation verbs), 133-152.
Majid, Azifa, James S. Boster and Melissa Bowerman. 2008. The crosslinguistic categorization of everyday events: A study of cutting and breaking. Cognition 108:2, 175-294.
Michele I. Feist (Louisiana) and Brooke O. Breaux (Lafayette)
Sunday, May 20th
Buchanan B213
Prepositions are highly polysemous, naming both spatial (e.g., apples in bowls) and metaphorical (e.g., Jim’s in pain) relationships. According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, these meanings are organized within people’s mental lexicons via metaphorically-based connections, with nonphysical meanings conceptualized in terms of physical ones (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). If conceptualization influences on-line processing, metaphorical meanings of prepositions should be processed in terms of spatial meanings, but not vice-versa (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000). To test the psychological reality of these connections, we designed two semantic priming experiments with participants assessing whether phrases and images were natural/expected or unnatural/unexpected.
In Experiment 1, stimulus pairs were created with spatial stimuli (photographic images depicting one object in relation to another) presented before metaphorical stimuli (attested phrases consisting of a preposition followed by an abstract noun). We varied metaphorical relatedness, with pairs based on either the same or different prepositions, and response type, with both prime and target natural/expected (matched) or prime unnatural/unexpected and target natural/expected (mismatched). While response type was the dominant predictor of response speed for on phrases—with matched pair phrases being responded to faster than mismatched pair phrases, F(1, 16) = 11.46, p = .004 (Figure 1), for in phrases this effect was modulated by relatedness—as demonstrated by an interaction of the two factors, F(1, 16) = 7.19, p = .016 (Figure 2), suggesting that metaphorical relatedness influences the processing of in but not on phrases.
In Experiment 2, we asked whether processing metaphorical on and in phrases would influence processing of spatial images. For each stimulus pair, we presented an on or in phrase before either a related (on or in) image or an unrelated image. We found that responses to both on and in images were faster than responses to unrelated images, F(1, 18) = 9.11, p = .007 and F(1, 16) = 18.93, p < .001, respectively. To test whether these results were due to a difference between related and unrelated pairs and not simply a difference in processing between image types, we presented the images outside of the priming context. Only responses to in images were faster than responses to unrelated images, F(1, 17) = 6.50, p = .021, suggesting that metaphorical phrases may prime on but not in images.
These findings support the claim that even conventionalized metaphorically-based connections can be accessed during on-line processing; however, these connections may differ across prepositions. Previous work has noted that in occurs in more contexts, and participates more freely in novel combinations, than does on (Breaux & Feist, 2010; Navarro, 1998). We suggest that the strength and direction of the on-line connections may be related to the ability of prepositions to combine to form novel uses (Breaux & Feist, 2010). A strong connection from spatial to abstract meaning and ease of creating novel combinations may indicate that a metaphor is “live”, while a strong connection from abstract to spatial meaning and more restricted ease of combination may be hallmarks of a metaphor that is no longer productive.
(See the attached PDF for charts)
References
Boroditsky, L. (2000). Metaphoric structuring: Understanding time through spatial metaphors. Cognition, 75(1), 1-28.
Breaux, B. O., & Feist, M. I. (2010). Extending beyond space. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (Eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, pp. 1601-1606.
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Navarro i Ferrando, I. (1998). A Cognitive Semantics analysis of the Lexical Units AT, ON and IN, in English. (Doctoral dissertation, University Jaume I, 1998). Retrieved from http://www.tesisenxarxa.net/TESIS_UJI/AVAILABLE/TDX-0804103- 133233//navarro.pdf
David J. DeLiema & Francis F. Steen (UCLA)
Saturday, May 19th
Buchanan B215
In partial response to empirical and theoretical progress in articulating an
embodied framework of cognition (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg and
Kaschak, 2002), educational research on the role of gestures in science and math learning
environments has remained steady over recent decades (Goldin‐Meadow, S., Alibali, M. W.,
Church, R. B., 1993; Clement & Steinberg, 2002). Nonetheless, most gesture studies that
address an education audience have not fully integrated their empirical discoveries with
any specific cognitive model, a shortcoming that has held researchers back from discussing
the true complexity of gestures around concept learning. In an attempt to begin to close
this gap, the present project will recruit the mental spaces cognitive framework as a lens to
describe and understand one student’s gestures around learning a complex, abstract
engineering concept.
From a theoretical perspective, the cognitive linguistics framework known as
mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1985; Parrill & Sweetser, 2004), extended in detail through the
theory of conceptual integration networks (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998), offers a lucid way
to relate mental constructs to sign language and other gestural simulations (Dudis, 2004).
In the mental spaces framework, selective inputs from the mental narrative space (i.e.
frames, elements, and relations between elements) combine with selective inputs from the
real space of the body to produce a blend simulating the referent process (Parrill &
Sweetser, 2004). For example, a person who gestures the action of riding a motorcycle
uphill from a character viewpoint, with hands pretending to grasp handle bars, blends her
narrative representation of riding motorcycles with a partial representation of the physical
action involved in riding to create one unified simulation of motorcycle riding (Dudis,
2004).
The mental spaces framework will be applied in the present study to analyze a
situation in which one undergraduate student was asked to learn the system of packet
switching – the underlying design of the Internet – by listening to a verbal description of
the concept and simultaneously modeling the concept with her body. In other words, the
student silently gestured her interpretation of packet switching during her first encounter
with the concept at the same time that an interlocutor described the concept in words.
Later, the student was asked to discuss her understanding of packet switching in a more
natural discourse setting and performed co‐speech gestures with which we can compare
the interpretive gestures. The study aims to understand how prior character viewpoint
motor schemas (i.e. throwing, pulling, chopping) and observer viewpoint motor schemas
(i.e. pointing at an airplane overhead) interact with assumptions about computers and
networks to instantiate as abstracted versions of those actions in the gesture blend. How
do representations in the blend change in terms of scale, viewpoint, and form over time as
the student refines her understanding of packet switching and what implications does this
have for the evolution of conceptual blends over short time scales? The presentation will
include video clips of the student’s gestures.
Barsalou, Lawrence W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
22, 577‐660
Clement, J. J. and Steinberg, M. S., (2002). Step‐Wise Evolution of Mental Models of Electric
Circuits: A “Learning‐Aloud” Case Study. The Journal of the Learning Sciences, 11(4), 389‐
452.
Dudis, P. G. (2004). Body partitioning and real‐space blends. Cognitive Linguistics, 15(2),
223‐238.
Faucconier, G. (1985). Mental spaces. Aspects of meaning construction in natural language.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press‐Bradford Books.
Fauconnier, G. & Turner, M. (1998). Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science, 22,
133‐187.
Gallese, V., Lakoff, G. (2005). The brain’s concepts: The role of the sensory‐motor system in
conceptual knowledge. Cognitive neuropsychology, 22(3/4), 455‐479.
Glenberg, A. M., Kaschak, M. P. (2002). Grounding language in action. Psychological Bulletins
& Review, 9(3), 558‐565.
Goldin‐Meadow, S., Alibali, M. W., Church, R. B. (1993). Transitions in concept acquisition:
Using the hand to read the mind. Psychological Review, 100(2), 279‐297.
Parill, F. & Sweetser, E. (2004). What we mean by meaning Conceptual integration in
gesture analysis and transcription. Gesture, 4(2), 197‐219.
Ineke Bockting (Catholic University of Paris)
Friday, May 18th
Buchanan B213
My field of interest is the linguistic structure of the attributive clause from a cognitive point of view, with a special interest in the so-called small-clause. With this term linguists refer to the complement of a mental activity verb that, if it is verbal, uses a nonfinite form of the verb without the infinite marker “to” or, alternatively, a progressive tense. In contrast to other types of complements of mental activity verbs, such as the that-clause, the how-clause and the to-infinitive clause, this linguistic form is non-epistemic in that it makes no reference to a truth judgment by either the narrator or the experiencer. In other words, it allows for the expression of experience without any intellectual mediation, “raw” as it were.
The small-clause, therefore, is a gold-mine for the depiction of various forms of limited, disturbed or altered consciousness—when intellectual mediation is underdeveloped, degenerated or temporarily dysfunctional—such as those connected with mental retardation, mental illness, epilepsy, situations of extreme mental stress and dreamlike, hypnotic, hallucinatory and exaltated states.
My contribution will start with discussion of the different cognitive aspects of the small clause and their literary possibilities. I will then focus on a number of passages in the work of Flannery OʼConnor and other writers, so as to show the different ways in which the small clause is used to depict a character in the throws of a religious experience.
Dana Abdulrahim (University of Alberta)
Saturday, May 19th
Buchanan A hallway on the 2nd floor
Within the different varieties of Arabic, terms denoting body parts are deployed in multiple ways besides their basic referential uses. Similar to English, for instance, the terms raʔs ‘head’ can mark spatial relations as in raʔs altawela ‘head of the table’. The term denoting EYE, ʕayn, can be used metaphorically and metonymically in expressions such as ʕayn alsˤawab ‘eye of the correctness/rightness’, where ʕayn EYE is used to refer to ‘essence’ or ‘core’. Body part terms in Arabic can also serve as roots or stems from which verbs and other lexical items can be derived, as in the following examples.
1. ʕa:yana alatˤibbaʔ sittina mariðˤan
ʕayn:VF3:3SM:PERF the doctors sixty patient
The doctors examined sixty patients
2. ʕayyanat alħukuma waziran jadidan lilsiħħa
ʕayn:VF2:3SF:PERF the government minister new for health
The government appointed a new minister of health
3. taʕayyana ʕala haʔulaʔ alzuʕamaʔ ʔirðˤaʔ ʃuʕubihim
ʕayn:VF5:3SM:PERF on those leaders satisfaction people:GEN
It became obligatory for those leaders to satisfy their people In (1), the verb ʕa:yana typically involves a typical use of the body part term, EYE. It therefore relates to SEEING in a way similar to the English ‘to eyeball something’, where the notion of examining and investigating is involved. Such usage conforms to the assumption that verb forms derived from body part terms normally signal bodily functions associated with these body parts. Eye is therefore typically associated with SEEING, ear with HEARING, nose with SMELLING, etc. We can see, however, that in (2) and (3) the relation to ‘eye’ is less transparent. These two instances, along with many others, show that meanings of such verbs in Arabic are not necessarily predictable, neither by the body parts they associate with nor by the semantic information presumably residing in the different morphological patterns of the Arabic verb.
This unpredictability of meaning extensions calls for scrutinizing the argument structure of the constructions that host these verbs. This involves selecting a wide range of verbs derived from body part terms in Classical and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), such as HEAD, FACE, EYE, EAR, NOSE, NECK, BELLY, TONGUE, ARM, etc. and examining their contextualized uses extracted from Classical (usage-based) dictionaries as well as MSA corpora. More specifically, I will be examining the syntactic properties of the argument structure (e.g. transitivity, collocation with prepositional phrases, etc.) as well as the semantic properties of the different arguments, for instance whether a certain verb favors human or non-human agents. Analyzing the interaction between these verbs and the various constructional elements they associate with should give us a better understanding of the patterns of coercion of verb senses into the more opaque and complex senses.
Heine, Bernd, and Kuteva, Tania. 2002. World Lexicon of Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press